Model Theoretical Interpretation of the Incompleteness of Number TheoryDecidability of the Riemann Hypothesis vs. the Goldbach ConjectureWhy doesn't Gödel's incompleteness theorem apply to false statements?Are there statements that are undecidable but not provably undecidable True and provably true sentences in a model. Are they the same thing?Showing there does not exist a formal proof of a formula $phi$.Why do we know that Gödel sentences are true in the standard model of set theory, but do not know if the continuum hypothesis is?Proof by Contradiction and False PremisesIs Gödel's modified liar an illogical statement?Decidability of the Riemann Hypothesis vs. the Goldbach ConjectureA axiomatization of (full) Second Order Logic with a decidable proof system cannot be complete; is this true if we only require semi-decidability?Why does, in theory, you can prove Riemann hypothesis with Godel Incompleteness Theorem, but can't prove the consistency of mathematics?Is it true that models over a complete set of sentences over an L-structure are always isomorphic?

Approximately how much travel time was saved by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869?

Test whether all array elements are factors of a number

Why Is Death Allowed In the Matrix?

Why was the small council so happy for Tyrion to become the Master of Coin?

The use of multiple foreign keys on same column in SQL Server

Why do falling prices hurt debtors?

How do we improve the relationship with a client software team that performs poorly and is becoming less collaborative?

How does one intimidate enemies without having the capacity for violence?

Windows 98 hangs after entering password on fresh install

Is this a crack on the carbon frame?

How to write a macro that is braces sensitive?

Font hinting is lost in Chrome-like browsers (for some languages )

What's the output of a record cartridge playing an out-of-speed record

Why doesn't Newton's third law mean a person bounces back to where they started when they hit the ground?

Why does Kotter return in Welcome Back Kotter?

Why don't electron-positron collisions release infinite energy?

What typically incentivizes a professor to change jobs to a lower ranking university?

can i play a electric guitar through a bass amp?

Mathematical cryptic clues

How is the claim "I am in New York only if I am in America" the same as "If I am in New York, then I am in America?

Risk of getting Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in the United States?

How did the USSR manage to innovate in an environment characterized by government censorship and high bureaucracy?

What defenses are there against being summoned by the Gate spell?

Do I have a twin with permutated remainders?



Model Theoretical Interpretation of the Incompleteness of Number Theory


Decidability of the Riemann Hypothesis vs. the Goldbach ConjectureWhy doesn't Gödel's incompleteness theorem apply to false statements?Are there statements that are undecidable but not provably undecidable True and provably true sentences in a model. Are they the same thing?Showing there does not exist a formal proof of a formula $phi$.Why do we know that Gödel sentences are true in the standard model of set theory, but do not know if the continuum hypothesis is?Proof by Contradiction and False PremisesIs Gödel's modified liar an illogical statement?Decidability of the Riemann Hypothesis vs. the Goldbach ConjectureA axiomatization of (full) Second Order Logic with a decidable proof system cannot be complete; is this true if we only require semi-decidability?Why does, in theory, you can prove Riemann hypothesis with Godel Incompleteness Theorem, but can't prove the consistency of mathematics?Is it true that models over a complete set of sentences over an L-structure are always isomorphic?













1












$begingroup$


This question was sparked by this Numberphile video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4ndIDcDSGc. Near the end, (12:05), he speaks about the Riemann Hypothesis. He describes that if Riemann is shown to be an unprovable statement, then this proves that Riemann is true. For if it were false then it would be provably false (demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $frac12$) and thus decidable, contradiction.



My question is about the model theoretic interpretation of this. From my understanding, undecidable sentences are not valid and their negations are not valid. This is from the completeness of the logic i.e. $vdashA$ if and only if $vDashA$. Thus, if $A$ is undeceivable then for some models of the theory in predicate calculus, $A$ is $mathscrT$ and other models where $A$ is $mathscrF$.




If we show Riemann to be undecidable, how can we really say it is true if it is only sometimes true as described above?











share|cite|improve this question











$endgroup$











  • $begingroup$
    Validity is "true in every model" : $vDash A$. But we have formulas that are true in a structure and not valid : : $mathbb N vDash forall n (n ge 0)$.
    $endgroup$
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 22 at 7:11











  • $begingroup$
    Related: math.stackexchange.com/questions/3153739/… and math.stackexchange.com/questions/2305177/…
    $endgroup$
    – Asaf Karagila
    Mar 22 at 13:09















1












$begingroup$


This question was sparked by this Numberphile video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4ndIDcDSGc. Near the end, (12:05), he speaks about the Riemann Hypothesis. He describes that if Riemann is shown to be an unprovable statement, then this proves that Riemann is true. For if it were false then it would be provably false (demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $frac12$) and thus decidable, contradiction.



My question is about the model theoretic interpretation of this. From my understanding, undecidable sentences are not valid and their negations are not valid. This is from the completeness of the logic i.e. $vdashA$ if and only if $vDashA$. Thus, if $A$ is undeceivable then for some models of the theory in predicate calculus, $A$ is $mathscrT$ and other models where $A$ is $mathscrF$.




If we show Riemann to be undecidable, how can we really say it is true if it is only sometimes true as described above?











share|cite|improve this question











$endgroup$











  • $begingroup$
    Validity is "true in every model" : $vDash A$. But we have formulas that are true in a structure and not valid : : $mathbb N vDash forall n (n ge 0)$.
    $endgroup$
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 22 at 7:11











  • $begingroup$
    Related: math.stackexchange.com/questions/3153739/… and math.stackexchange.com/questions/2305177/…
    $endgroup$
    – Asaf Karagila
    Mar 22 at 13:09













1












1








1





$begingroup$


This question was sparked by this Numberphile video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4ndIDcDSGc. Near the end, (12:05), he speaks about the Riemann Hypothesis. He describes that if Riemann is shown to be an unprovable statement, then this proves that Riemann is true. For if it were false then it would be provably false (demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $frac12$) and thus decidable, contradiction.



My question is about the model theoretic interpretation of this. From my understanding, undecidable sentences are not valid and their negations are not valid. This is from the completeness of the logic i.e. $vdashA$ if and only if $vDashA$. Thus, if $A$ is undeceivable then for some models of the theory in predicate calculus, $A$ is $mathscrT$ and other models where $A$ is $mathscrF$.




If we show Riemann to be undecidable, how can we really say it is true if it is only sometimes true as described above?











share|cite|improve this question











$endgroup$




This question was sparked by this Numberphile video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4ndIDcDSGc. Near the end, (12:05), he speaks about the Riemann Hypothesis. He describes that if Riemann is shown to be an unprovable statement, then this proves that Riemann is true. For if it were false then it would be provably false (demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $frac12$) and thus decidable, contradiction.



My question is about the model theoretic interpretation of this. From my understanding, undecidable sentences are not valid and their negations are not valid. This is from the completeness of the logic i.e. $vdashA$ if and only if $vDashA$. Thus, if $A$ is undeceivable then for some models of the theory in predicate calculus, $A$ is $mathscrT$ and other models where $A$ is $mathscrF$.




If we show Riemann to be undecidable, how can we really say it is true if it is only sometimes true as described above?








logic model-theory proof-theory incompleteness decidability






share|cite|improve this question















share|cite|improve this question













share|cite|improve this question




share|cite|improve this question








edited Mar 22 at 1:20









J. W. Tanner

4,4891320




4,4891320










asked Mar 22 at 1:14









BENGBENG

425




425











  • $begingroup$
    Validity is "true in every model" : $vDash A$. But we have formulas that are true in a structure and not valid : : $mathbb N vDash forall n (n ge 0)$.
    $endgroup$
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 22 at 7:11











  • $begingroup$
    Related: math.stackexchange.com/questions/3153739/… and math.stackexchange.com/questions/2305177/…
    $endgroup$
    – Asaf Karagila
    Mar 22 at 13:09
















  • $begingroup$
    Validity is "true in every model" : $vDash A$. But we have formulas that are true in a structure and not valid : : $mathbb N vDash forall n (n ge 0)$.
    $endgroup$
    – Mauro ALLEGRANZA
    Mar 22 at 7:11











  • $begingroup$
    Related: math.stackexchange.com/questions/3153739/… and math.stackexchange.com/questions/2305177/…
    $endgroup$
    – Asaf Karagila
    Mar 22 at 13:09















$begingroup$
Validity is "true in every model" : $vDash A$. But we have formulas that are true in a structure and not valid : : $mathbb N vDash forall n (n ge 0)$.
$endgroup$
– Mauro ALLEGRANZA
Mar 22 at 7:11





$begingroup$
Validity is "true in every model" : $vDash A$. But we have formulas that are true in a structure and not valid : : $mathbb N vDash forall n (n ge 0)$.
$endgroup$
– Mauro ALLEGRANZA
Mar 22 at 7:11













$begingroup$
Related: math.stackexchange.com/questions/3153739/… and math.stackexchange.com/questions/2305177/…
$endgroup$
– Asaf Karagila
Mar 22 at 13:09




$begingroup$
Related: math.stackexchange.com/questions/3153739/… and math.stackexchange.com/questions/2305177/…
$endgroup$
– Asaf Karagila
Mar 22 at 13:09










2 Answers
2






active

oldest

votes


















5












$begingroup$

Edit- Added more thorough explanation



When they say the Riemann Hypothesis is true (or anyone says any mathematical assertion is true), they don't mean it is 'logically valid', they mean that it is true, i.e. that there are no nontrivial zeros of the zeta function.



It's not even clear without further elaboration what precisely it would mean for the Riemann Hypothesis to be logically valid. First we must cast the Riemann hypothesis (or some equivalent statement) as a sentence in some formal language, and only then we can start talking about interpretations and validity. Once we've done this, the idea of the sentence being "true" becomes a statement about one interpretation, usually called the 'standard' or 'intended' interpretation / model.



It is certainly not saying that it is valid in predicate logic, i.e. true in every interpretation, which is a very strong statement. More reasonable would be that it is a logical consequence of some effectively describable collection of axioms (perhaps PA if the language is arithmetic... more on that below), i.e. it is true in any model of those axioms. But even in this case there are generally many unintended models that don't have much bearing on ordinary mathematics, so they don't mean that either.



So the way to think about it is just like they say: if RH is false (in the standard interpretation), then its negation is provable, and hence it is not undecidable. So undecidable implies true (in the standard interpretation). If we want to be more model theoretic, we could say that if RH is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models, but really it's easiest to see that it is refutable directly, which implies by soundness that it is false in all models.



(And let me emphasize again, we've been pretty noncommittal about questions like 'what version of RH?', 'expressed in what language?', and 'model of what axioms?'... all of which needs to be fleshed out).



So the assertion in the video makes sense, and as they say, the reasoning is that if RH were false, it would be refutable. However, they gloss over the explanation, perhaps leaving you with the incorrect impression that it is trivial. Even the basic reasoning that if there's a counterexample (i.e. a nontrivial zero), we can check it, is annoyingly very close to being correct while still being very misleading.



To understand why this is an oversimplification, think about what would naively go into 'checking a zero'. The value of the zero itself may in principle contain an infinite amount of information (it's a complex number after all). There's no obvious reason why checking that it gives zero when plugged into the zeta function would be an effective procedure that translates to an effective proof. So its falsity is not "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero".



However, it has been known for some time that RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ sentence of arithmetic, which is a sentence of the form "for all natural numbers $n$ the effectively computable property $P(n)$ holds" (and this fact isn't obvious unless you are a analytic number theorist well-versed in formalizing things in arithmetic). In this form it is obvious that it is refutable if false, since it is now clear that the procedure for verifying a given counterexample to $P(n)$ is effective, so any reasonable system will be able to turn this into a proof of $exists n lnot P(n)$



Original answer:



The truth they refer to is truth in the standard model, not validity. So the way to look at it is that if the Riemann Hypothesis is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models and hence not undecidable. The reason, as it says in the numberphile video, is that if it is false, then its negation is provable, and thus it is false in all models. This is due to the nontrivial theorem that the RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ arithmetical sentence, so a (standard) counterexample to the Riemann Hypothesis will be witnessed by a finite arithmetical computation. (I haven’t watched the numberphile video (I’m traveling) but I’m guessing they oversimplified this... it would not be enough for a counterexample to exist... it needs to be provable.)






share|cite|improve this answer











$endgroup$








  • 1




    $begingroup$
    I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
    $endgroup$
    – Carl Mummert
    Mar 22 at 12:35


















2












$begingroup$

This is too long for a comment, so I have made it a community wiki post. It is correct that, if the Riemann Hypothesis is false, there is a concrete example. But that example will almost certainly not be "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$".



Assume there is a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$. There may be no nice analytic expression for it. We could begin to approximate it, but there is no reason to think that we would actually see "zero" from that approximation. We might see that the results are getting closer and closer to zero, but there is no reason to be certain that we could prove that some particular complex number is a counterexample. There is no reason to think that a root-finding process would produce a counterexample in a finite amount of time. This is closely tied to the issue that the usual statement of the Riemann Hypothesis involves complex numbers, rather than natural numbers.



However, Lagarias proved in 2002 [1] that there is a statement equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis that, when stated carefully, can be stated as a formula that quantifies only over natural numbers and only with leading universal quantifiers. For this particular kind of statement, if it is false then there is a concrete counterexample consisting of natural numbers only. This kind of statement is called $Pi^0_1$ in logic. So the claim being made on the video is correct, but the reasoning that was provided in the video is more questionable.



1: An Elementary Problem Equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis,
Jeffrey C. Lagarias, The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 109, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 2002), pp. 534-543. ArXiV preprint.






share|cite|improve this answer











$endgroup$













    Your Answer





    StackExchange.ifUsing("editor", function ()
    return StackExchange.using("mathjaxEditing", function ()
    StackExchange.MarkdownEditor.creationCallbacks.add(function (editor, postfix)
    StackExchange.mathjaxEditing.prepareWmdForMathJax(editor, postfix, [["$", "$"], ["\\(","\\)"]]);
    );
    );
    , "mathjax-editing");

    StackExchange.ready(function()
    var channelOptions =
    tags: "".split(" "),
    id: "69"
    ;
    initTagRenderer("".split(" "), "".split(" "), channelOptions);

    StackExchange.using("externalEditor", function()
    // Have to fire editor after snippets, if snippets enabled
    if (StackExchange.settings.snippets.snippetsEnabled)
    StackExchange.using("snippets", function()
    createEditor();
    );

    else
    createEditor();

    );

    function createEditor()
    StackExchange.prepareEditor(
    heartbeatType: 'answer',
    autoActivateHeartbeat: false,
    convertImagesToLinks: true,
    noModals: true,
    showLowRepImageUploadWarning: true,
    reputationToPostImages: 10,
    bindNavPrevention: true,
    postfix: "",
    imageUploader:
    brandingHtml: "Powered by u003ca class="icon-imgur-white" href="https://imgur.com/"u003eu003c/au003e",
    contentPolicyHtml: "User contributions licensed under u003ca href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/"u003ecc by-sa 3.0 with attribution requiredu003c/au003e u003ca href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/content-policy"u003e(content policy)u003c/au003e",
    allowUrls: true
    ,
    noCode: true, onDemand: true,
    discardSelector: ".discard-answer"
    ,immediatelyShowMarkdownHelp:true
    );



    );













    draft saved

    draft discarded


















    StackExchange.ready(
    function ()
    StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fmath.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f3157609%2fmodel-theoretical-interpretation-of-the-incompleteness-of-number-theory%23new-answer', 'question_page');

    );

    Post as a guest















    Required, but never shown

























    2 Answers
    2






    active

    oldest

    votes








    2 Answers
    2






    active

    oldest

    votes









    active

    oldest

    votes






    active

    oldest

    votes









    5












    $begingroup$

    Edit- Added more thorough explanation



    When they say the Riemann Hypothesis is true (or anyone says any mathematical assertion is true), they don't mean it is 'logically valid', they mean that it is true, i.e. that there are no nontrivial zeros of the zeta function.



    It's not even clear without further elaboration what precisely it would mean for the Riemann Hypothesis to be logically valid. First we must cast the Riemann hypothesis (or some equivalent statement) as a sentence in some formal language, and only then we can start talking about interpretations and validity. Once we've done this, the idea of the sentence being "true" becomes a statement about one interpretation, usually called the 'standard' or 'intended' interpretation / model.



    It is certainly not saying that it is valid in predicate logic, i.e. true in every interpretation, which is a very strong statement. More reasonable would be that it is a logical consequence of some effectively describable collection of axioms (perhaps PA if the language is arithmetic... more on that below), i.e. it is true in any model of those axioms. But even in this case there are generally many unintended models that don't have much bearing on ordinary mathematics, so they don't mean that either.



    So the way to think about it is just like they say: if RH is false (in the standard interpretation), then its negation is provable, and hence it is not undecidable. So undecidable implies true (in the standard interpretation). If we want to be more model theoretic, we could say that if RH is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models, but really it's easiest to see that it is refutable directly, which implies by soundness that it is false in all models.



    (And let me emphasize again, we've been pretty noncommittal about questions like 'what version of RH?', 'expressed in what language?', and 'model of what axioms?'... all of which needs to be fleshed out).



    So the assertion in the video makes sense, and as they say, the reasoning is that if RH were false, it would be refutable. However, they gloss over the explanation, perhaps leaving you with the incorrect impression that it is trivial. Even the basic reasoning that if there's a counterexample (i.e. a nontrivial zero), we can check it, is annoyingly very close to being correct while still being very misleading.



    To understand why this is an oversimplification, think about what would naively go into 'checking a zero'. The value of the zero itself may in principle contain an infinite amount of information (it's a complex number after all). There's no obvious reason why checking that it gives zero when plugged into the zeta function would be an effective procedure that translates to an effective proof. So its falsity is not "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero".



    However, it has been known for some time that RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ sentence of arithmetic, which is a sentence of the form "for all natural numbers $n$ the effectively computable property $P(n)$ holds" (and this fact isn't obvious unless you are a analytic number theorist well-versed in formalizing things in arithmetic). In this form it is obvious that it is refutable if false, since it is now clear that the procedure for verifying a given counterexample to $P(n)$ is effective, so any reasonable system will be able to turn this into a proof of $exists n lnot P(n)$



    Original answer:



    The truth they refer to is truth in the standard model, not validity. So the way to look at it is that if the Riemann Hypothesis is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models and hence not undecidable. The reason, as it says in the numberphile video, is that if it is false, then its negation is provable, and thus it is false in all models. This is due to the nontrivial theorem that the RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ arithmetical sentence, so a (standard) counterexample to the Riemann Hypothesis will be witnessed by a finite arithmetical computation. (I haven’t watched the numberphile video (I’m traveling) but I’m guessing they oversimplified this... it would not be enough for a counterexample to exist... it needs to be provable.)






    share|cite|improve this answer











    $endgroup$








    • 1




      $begingroup$
      I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
      $endgroup$
      – Carl Mummert
      Mar 22 at 12:35















    5












    $begingroup$

    Edit- Added more thorough explanation



    When they say the Riemann Hypothesis is true (or anyone says any mathematical assertion is true), they don't mean it is 'logically valid', they mean that it is true, i.e. that there are no nontrivial zeros of the zeta function.



    It's not even clear without further elaboration what precisely it would mean for the Riemann Hypothesis to be logically valid. First we must cast the Riemann hypothesis (or some equivalent statement) as a sentence in some formal language, and only then we can start talking about interpretations and validity. Once we've done this, the idea of the sentence being "true" becomes a statement about one interpretation, usually called the 'standard' or 'intended' interpretation / model.



    It is certainly not saying that it is valid in predicate logic, i.e. true in every interpretation, which is a very strong statement. More reasonable would be that it is a logical consequence of some effectively describable collection of axioms (perhaps PA if the language is arithmetic... more on that below), i.e. it is true in any model of those axioms. But even in this case there are generally many unintended models that don't have much bearing on ordinary mathematics, so they don't mean that either.



    So the way to think about it is just like they say: if RH is false (in the standard interpretation), then its negation is provable, and hence it is not undecidable. So undecidable implies true (in the standard interpretation). If we want to be more model theoretic, we could say that if RH is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models, but really it's easiest to see that it is refutable directly, which implies by soundness that it is false in all models.



    (And let me emphasize again, we've been pretty noncommittal about questions like 'what version of RH?', 'expressed in what language?', and 'model of what axioms?'... all of which needs to be fleshed out).



    So the assertion in the video makes sense, and as they say, the reasoning is that if RH were false, it would be refutable. However, they gloss over the explanation, perhaps leaving you with the incorrect impression that it is trivial. Even the basic reasoning that if there's a counterexample (i.e. a nontrivial zero), we can check it, is annoyingly very close to being correct while still being very misleading.



    To understand why this is an oversimplification, think about what would naively go into 'checking a zero'. The value of the zero itself may in principle contain an infinite amount of information (it's a complex number after all). There's no obvious reason why checking that it gives zero when plugged into the zeta function would be an effective procedure that translates to an effective proof. So its falsity is not "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero".



    However, it has been known for some time that RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ sentence of arithmetic, which is a sentence of the form "for all natural numbers $n$ the effectively computable property $P(n)$ holds" (and this fact isn't obvious unless you are a analytic number theorist well-versed in formalizing things in arithmetic). In this form it is obvious that it is refutable if false, since it is now clear that the procedure for verifying a given counterexample to $P(n)$ is effective, so any reasonable system will be able to turn this into a proof of $exists n lnot P(n)$



    Original answer:



    The truth they refer to is truth in the standard model, not validity. So the way to look at it is that if the Riemann Hypothesis is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models and hence not undecidable. The reason, as it says in the numberphile video, is that if it is false, then its negation is provable, and thus it is false in all models. This is due to the nontrivial theorem that the RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ arithmetical sentence, so a (standard) counterexample to the Riemann Hypothesis will be witnessed by a finite arithmetical computation. (I haven’t watched the numberphile video (I’m traveling) but I’m guessing they oversimplified this... it would not be enough for a counterexample to exist... it needs to be provable.)






    share|cite|improve this answer











    $endgroup$








    • 1




      $begingroup$
      I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
      $endgroup$
      – Carl Mummert
      Mar 22 at 12:35













    5












    5








    5





    $begingroup$

    Edit- Added more thorough explanation



    When they say the Riemann Hypothesis is true (or anyone says any mathematical assertion is true), they don't mean it is 'logically valid', they mean that it is true, i.e. that there are no nontrivial zeros of the zeta function.



    It's not even clear without further elaboration what precisely it would mean for the Riemann Hypothesis to be logically valid. First we must cast the Riemann hypothesis (or some equivalent statement) as a sentence in some formal language, and only then we can start talking about interpretations and validity. Once we've done this, the idea of the sentence being "true" becomes a statement about one interpretation, usually called the 'standard' or 'intended' interpretation / model.



    It is certainly not saying that it is valid in predicate logic, i.e. true in every interpretation, which is a very strong statement. More reasonable would be that it is a logical consequence of some effectively describable collection of axioms (perhaps PA if the language is arithmetic... more on that below), i.e. it is true in any model of those axioms. But even in this case there are generally many unintended models that don't have much bearing on ordinary mathematics, so they don't mean that either.



    So the way to think about it is just like they say: if RH is false (in the standard interpretation), then its negation is provable, and hence it is not undecidable. So undecidable implies true (in the standard interpretation). If we want to be more model theoretic, we could say that if RH is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models, but really it's easiest to see that it is refutable directly, which implies by soundness that it is false in all models.



    (And let me emphasize again, we've been pretty noncommittal about questions like 'what version of RH?', 'expressed in what language?', and 'model of what axioms?'... all of which needs to be fleshed out).



    So the assertion in the video makes sense, and as they say, the reasoning is that if RH were false, it would be refutable. However, they gloss over the explanation, perhaps leaving you with the incorrect impression that it is trivial. Even the basic reasoning that if there's a counterexample (i.e. a nontrivial zero), we can check it, is annoyingly very close to being correct while still being very misleading.



    To understand why this is an oversimplification, think about what would naively go into 'checking a zero'. The value of the zero itself may in principle contain an infinite amount of information (it's a complex number after all). There's no obvious reason why checking that it gives zero when plugged into the zeta function would be an effective procedure that translates to an effective proof. So its falsity is not "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero".



    However, it has been known for some time that RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ sentence of arithmetic, which is a sentence of the form "for all natural numbers $n$ the effectively computable property $P(n)$ holds" (and this fact isn't obvious unless you are a analytic number theorist well-versed in formalizing things in arithmetic). In this form it is obvious that it is refutable if false, since it is now clear that the procedure for verifying a given counterexample to $P(n)$ is effective, so any reasonable system will be able to turn this into a proof of $exists n lnot P(n)$



    Original answer:



    The truth they refer to is truth in the standard model, not validity. So the way to look at it is that if the Riemann Hypothesis is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models and hence not undecidable. The reason, as it says in the numberphile video, is that if it is false, then its negation is provable, and thus it is false in all models. This is due to the nontrivial theorem that the RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ arithmetical sentence, so a (standard) counterexample to the Riemann Hypothesis will be witnessed by a finite arithmetical computation. (I haven’t watched the numberphile video (I’m traveling) but I’m guessing they oversimplified this... it would not be enough for a counterexample to exist... it needs to be provable.)






    share|cite|improve this answer











    $endgroup$



    Edit- Added more thorough explanation



    When they say the Riemann Hypothesis is true (or anyone says any mathematical assertion is true), they don't mean it is 'logically valid', they mean that it is true, i.e. that there are no nontrivial zeros of the zeta function.



    It's not even clear without further elaboration what precisely it would mean for the Riemann Hypothesis to be logically valid. First we must cast the Riemann hypothesis (or some equivalent statement) as a sentence in some formal language, and only then we can start talking about interpretations and validity. Once we've done this, the idea of the sentence being "true" becomes a statement about one interpretation, usually called the 'standard' or 'intended' interpretation / model.



    It is certainly not saying that it is valid in predicate logic, i.e. true in every interpretation, which is a very strong statement. More reasonable would be that it is a logical consequence of some effectively describable collection of axioms (perhaps PA if the language is arithmetic... more on that below), i.e. it is true in any model of those axioms. But even in this case there are generally many unintended models that don't have much bearing on ordinary mathematics, so they don't mean that either.



    So the way to think about it is just like they say: if RH is false (in the standard interpretation), then its negation is provable, and hence it is not undecidable. So undecidable implies true (in the standard interpretation). If we want to be more model theoretic, we could say that if RH is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models, but really it's easiest to see that it is refutable directly, which implies by soundness that it is false in all models.



    (And let me emphasize again, we've been pretty noncommittal about questions like 'what version of RH?', 'expressed in what language?', and 'model of what axioms?'... all of which needs to be fleshed out).



    So the assertion in the video makes sense, and as they say, the reasoning is that if RH were false, it would be refutable. However, they gloss over the explanation, perhaps leaving you with the incorrect impression that it is trivial. Even the basic reasoning that if there's a counterexample (i.e. a nontrivial zero), we can check it, is annoyingly very close to being correct while still being very misleading.



    To understand why this is an oversimplification, think about what would naively go into 'checking a zero'. The value of the zero itself may in principle contain an infinite amount of information (it's a complex number after all). There's no obvious reason why checking that it gives zero when plugged into the zeta function would be an effective procedure that translates to an effective proof. So its falsity is not "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero".



    However, it has been known for some time that RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ sentence of arithmetic, which is a sentence of the form "for all natural numbers $n$ the effectively computable property $P(n)$ holds" (and this fact isn't obvious unless you are a analytic number theorist well-versed in formalizing things in arithmetic). In this form it is obvious that it is refutable if false, since it is now clear that the procedure for verifying a given counterexample to $P(n)$ is effective, so any reasonable system will be able to turn this into a proof of $exists n lnot P(n)$



    Original answer:



    The truth they refer to is truth in the standard model, not validity. So the way to look at it is that if the Riemann Hypothesis is false in the standard model, then it is false in all models and hence not undecidable. The reason, as it says in the numberphile video, is that if it is false, then its negation is provable, and thus it is false in all models. This is due to the nontrivial theorem that the RH is equivalent to a $Pi_1$ arithmetical sentence, so a (standard) counterexample to the Riemann Hypothesis will be witnessed by a finite arithmetical computation. (I haven’t watched the numberphile video (I’m traveling) but I’m guessing they oversimplified this... it would not be enough for a counterexample to exist... it needs to be provable.)







    share|cite|improve this answer














    share|cite|improve this answer



    share|cite|improve this answer








    edited Mar 24 at 2:35

























    answered Mar 22 at 2:10









    spaceisdarkgreenspaceisdarkgreen

    33.8k21753




    33.8k21753







    • 1




      $begingroup$
      I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
      $endgroup$
      – Carl Mummert
      Mar 22 at 12:35












    • 1




      $begingroup$
      I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
      $endgroup$
      – Carl Mummert
      Mar 22 at 12:35







    1




    1




    $begingroup$
    I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
    $endgroup$
    – Carl Mummert
    Mar 22 at 12:35




    $begingroup$
    I am glad you expanded the answer. I wrote a comment on the nature of the counterexample, overlapping with your edit.
    $endgroup$
    – Carl Mummert
    Mar 22 at 12:35











    2












    $begingroup$

    This is too long for a comment, so I have made it a community wiki post. It is correct that, if the Riemann Hypothesis is false, there is a concrete example. But that example will almost certainly not be "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$".



    Assume there is a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$. There may be no nice analytic expression for it. We could begin to approximate it, but there is no reason to think that we would actually see "zero" from that approximation. We might see that the results are getting closer and closer to zero, but there is no reason to be certain that we could prove that some particular complex number is a counterexample. There is no reason to think that a root-finding process would produce a counterexample in a finite amount of time. This is closely tied to the issue that the usual statement of the Riemann Hypothesis involves complex numbers, rather than natural numbers.



    However, Lagarias proved in 2002 [1] that there is a statement equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis that, when stated carefully, can be stated as a formula that quantifies only over natural numbers and only with leading universal quantifiers. For this particular kind of statement, if it is false then there is a concrete counterexample consisting of natural numbers only. This kind of statement is called $Pi^0_1$ in logic. So the claim being made on the video is correct, but the reasoning that was provided in the video is more questionable.



    1: An Elementary Problem Equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis,
    Jeffrey C. Lagarias, The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 109, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 2002), pp. 534-543. ArXiV preprint.






    share|cite|improve this answer











    $endgroup$

















      2












      $begingroup$

      This is too long for a comment, so I have made it a community wiki post. It is correct that, if the Riemann Hypothesis is false, there is a concrete example. But that example will almost certainly not be "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$".



      Assume there is a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$. There may be no nice analytic expression for it. We could begin to approximate it, but there is no reason to think that we would actually see "zero" from that approximation. We might see that the results are getting closer and closer to zero, but there is no reason to be certain that we could prove that some particular complex number is a counterexample. There is no reason to think that a root-finding process would produce a counterexample in a finite amount of time. This is closely tied to the issue that the usual statement of the Riemann Hypothesis involves complex numbers, rather than natural numbers.



      However, Lagarias proved in 2002 [1] that there is a statement equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis that, when stated carefully, can be stated as a formula that quantifies only over natural numbers and only with leading universal quantifiers. For this particular kind of statement, if it is false then there is a concrete counterexample consisting of natural numbers only. This kind of statement is called $Pi^0_1$ in logic. So the claim being made on the video is correct, but the reasoning that was provided in the video is more questionable.



      1: An Elementary Problem Equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis,
      Jeffrey C. Lagarias, The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 109, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 2002), pp. 534-543. ArXiV preprint.






      share|cite|improve this answer











      $endgroup$















        2












        2








        2





        $begingroup$

        This is too long for a comment, so I have made it a community wiki post. It is correct that, if the Riemann Hypothesis is false, there is a concrete example. But that example will almost certainly not be "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$".



        Assume there is a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$. There may be no nice analytic expression for it. We could begin to approximate it, but there is no reason to think that we would actually see "zero" from that approximation. We might see that the results are getting closer and closer to zero, but there is no reason to be certain that we could prove that some particular complex number is a counterexample. There is no reason to think that a root-finding process would produce a counterexample in a finite amount of time. This is closely tied to the issue that the usual statement of the Riemann Hypothesis involves complex numbers, rather than natural numbers.



        However, Lagarias proved in 2002 [1] that there is a statement equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis that, when stated carefully, can be stated as a formula that quantifies only over natural numbers and only with leading universal quantifiers. For this particular kind of statement, if it is false then there is a concrete counterexample consisting of natural numbers only. This kind of statement is called $Pi^0_1$ in logic. So the claim being made on the video is correct, but the reasoning that was provided in the video is more questionable.



        1: An Elementary Problem Equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis,
        Jeffrey C. Lagarias, The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 109, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 2002), pp. 534-543. ArXiV preprint.






        share|cite|improve this answer











        $endgroup$



        This is too long for a comment, so I have made it a community wiki post. It is correct that, if the Riemann Hypothesis is false, there is a concrete example. But that example will almost certainly not be "demonstrable by the existence of a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$".



        Assume there is a non-trivial zero not at $1/2$. There may be no nice analytic expression for it. We could begin to approximate it, but there is no reason to think that we would actually see "zero" from that approximation. We might see that the results are getting closer and closer to zero, but there is no reason to be certain that we could prove that some particular complex number is a counterexample. There is no reason to think that a root-finding process would produce a counterexample in a finite amount of time. This is closely tied to the issue that the usual statement of the Riemann Hypothesis involves complex numbers, rather than natural numbers.



        However, Lagarias proved in 2002 [1] that there is a statement equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis that, when stated carefully, can be stated as a formula that quantifies only over natural numbers and only with leading universal quantifiers. For this particular kind of statement, if it is false then there is a concrete counterexample consisting of natural numbers only. This kind of statement is called $Pi^0_1$ in logic. So the claim being made on the video is correct, but the reasoning that was provided in the video is more questionable.



        1: An Elementary Problem Equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis,
        Jeffrey C. Lagarias, The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 109, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 2002), pp. 534-543. ArXiV preprint.







        share|cite|improve this answer














        share|cite|improve this answer



        share|cite|improve this answer








        edited Mar 22 at 12:33


























        community wiki





        2 revs
        Carl Mummert




























            draft saved

            draft discarded
















































            Thanks for contributing an answer to Mathematics Stack Exchange!


            • Please be sure to answer the question. Provide details and share your research!

            But avoid


            • Asking for help, clarification, or responding to other answers.

            • Making statements based on opinion; back them up with references or personal experience.

            Use MathJax to format equations. MathJax reference.


            To learn more, see our tips on writing great answers.




            draft saved


            draft discarded














            StackExchange.ready(
            function ()
            StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fmath.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f3157609%2fmodel-theoretical-interpretation-of-the-incompleteness-of-number-theory%23new-answer', 'question_page');

            );

            Post as a guest















            Required, but never shown





















































            Required, but never shown














            Required, but never shown












            Required, but never shown







            Required, but never shown

































            Required, but never shown














            Required, but never shown












            Required, but never shown







            Required, but never shown







            Popular posts from this blog

            How should I support this large drywall patch? Planned maintenance scheduled April 23, 2019 at 00:00UTC (8:00pm US/Eastern) Announcing the arrival of Valued Associate #679: Cesar Manara Unicorn Meta Zoo #1: Why another podcast?How do I cover large gaps in drywall?How do I keep drywall around a patch from crumbling?Can I glue a second layer of drywall?How to patch long strip on drywall?Large drywall patch: how to avoid bulging seams?Drywall Mesh Patch vs. Bulge? To remove or not to remove?How to fix this drywall job?Prep drywall before backsplashWhat's the best way to fix this horrible drywall patch job?Drywall patching using 3M Patch Plus Primer

            random experiment with two different functions on unit interval Announcing the arrival of Valued Associate #679: Cesar Manara Planned maintenance scheduled April 23, 2019 at 00:00UTC (8:00pm US/Eastern)Random variable and probability space notionsRandom Walk with EdgesFinding functions where the increase over a random interval is Poisson distributedNumber of days until dayCan an observed event in fact be of zero probability?Unit random processmodels of coins and uniform distributionHow to get the number of successes given $n$ trials , probability $P$ and a random variable $X$Absorbing Markov chain in a computer. Is “almost every” turned into always convergence in computer executions?Stopped random walk is not uniformly integrable

            Lowndes Grove History Architecture References Navigation menu32°48′6″N 79°57′58″W / 32.80167°N 79.96611°W / 32.80167; -79.9661132°48′6″N 79°57′58″W / 32.80167°N 79.96611°W / 32.80167; -79.9661178002500"National Register Information System"Historic houses of South Carolina"Lowndes Grove""+32° 48' 6.00", −79° 57' 58.00""Lowndes Grove, Charleston County (260 St. Margaret St., Charleston)""Lowndes Grove"The Charleston ExpositionIt Happened in South Carolina"Lowndes Grove (House), Saint Margaret Street & Sixth Avenue, Charleston, Charleston County, SC(Photographs)"Plantations of the Carolina Low Countrye